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The FCC Under Mark Fowler:
A Mixed Bag
by HENRY GELLER*
In my opinion, the FCC under Chairman Mark Fowler calls
for a mixed verdict: from good to awful, as one proceeds from
common carrier to broadcast regulation.1 Like President Rea-
gan, whom Fowler much admires, the former chairman has a
clear and consistent philosophy: reliance on competition, the
marketplace, and, as much as possible, deregulation. The prob-
lem is that this philosophy fits some areas, such as common car-
rier, quite well but constitutes a misfit under the
Communications Act2 in other areas, such as broadcasting.
While Fowler had a perfect right to urge Congress to revise the
Communications Act, his obligation under the law was to en-
force the Act in an effective and objective manner. Because of
his controlling philosophy, he was largely a failure in areas like
broadcasting.
I
Common Carriers
The Chairman's policy views on common carriers are set out
in his 1986 law review article. When Fowler arrived in 1981,
FCC reliance on competition and the marketplace was already
in place. The Commission had deregulated customer premises
equipment and enhanced services, and had opened interstate
toll services to full competition.4 The Commission recognized
that telecommunications was now an area requiring fast re-
sponse to dynamic technology in the marketplace, and that this
was particularly so if telecommunications was to contribute to
* Director, Washington Center for Public Policy Research, Duke University;
B.S., University of Michigan, 1943; J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 1949.
1. It is fair to ascribe the FCC actions here discussed to Chairman Fowler be-
cause in all of them, he was the leader and had a clear majority for action.
2. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.§§ 151-611 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
3. Fowler, Halprin & Schlichting, "Back to the Future:" A Model for Telecom-
munications, 38 FED. COMM. L.J. 145 (1986) [hereinafter "Back to the Future"].
4. Id. at 156-57 and nn. 30, 35 & 36.
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U.S. productivity in the new global competition facing all indus-
trialized nations.
The basic policy was thus set when Fowler came on board,
but there was a need to bring the telephone toll system in line
with the new competitive milieu. In particular, it was necessary
to wring out the substantial subsidies in the system that had
developed in the monopoly environment. An arbitrarily large
portion of the non-traffic-sensitive (NTS) costs of the system
(e.g., the loop to the subscriber and the local switch) had been
shifted to the toll user in order to reduce charges at the local
level. This scheme gave false economic signals, inducing many
to enter or to take actions not because of efficiencies, but to
undercut or avoid the services being used for the subsidy (i.e.,
the toll service). The subsidies skew use at both ends, discour-
aging full and efficient use of the toll system (and thus its max-
imum contribution to productivity) and encouraging overuse at
the local level. Whatever the prospects for competition at the
local level, it cannot develop fully in such a distorted
environment.
To Fowler's great credit, he sought to wring out the subsidies
as rapidly as possible by use of the subscriber line charges.5 But
Fowler did not manage the process too well from a political
point of view: he sought to shift too much too quickly, failed
initially to work closely with the state commissions which have
considerable clout, and emphasized bypass instead of the need
for a full contribution to productivity.6 Fowler thus found his
policy thwarted to a substantial extent by Congress. He made
significant progress, but the process now seems to be at a stand-
still, substantially short of the full goal.' Let me make clear:
despite serious tactical lapses, Fowler deserves much credit for
dealing with subsidies. He is far more correct than his con-
sumer critics or opponents in Congress, who emphasize short-
term political considerations (i.e., that local rates not go up too
5. Id. at 179-84. The subscriber line charge is an access charge paid by the tele-
communications subscriber to defray fixed costs of providing local exchange access.
The charge is a fixed monthly fee assessed to subscribers by the telephone company
on each line. The amount of the monthly charge per line depends on decisions of
federal and state regulatory agencies.
6. To avoid the excessive NTS charges on toll calls referred to, large users can
use communications facilities other than the local telephone company (to whom the
charges are paid), hence the process is called bypass. Such facilities may be short-hop
microwave, cable TV facilities, or satellite to rooftop antennas.
7. "Back to the Future," supra note 3, at 182-83.
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much, since a significant number of their constituents make no
toll calls 8 and therefore do not gain by the corresponding de-
cline in toll rates).
Fowler continued the process of deregulating the Other
Common Carriers (OCCs),9 but did very little with respect to
AT&T. Several states were far ahead of the FCC, either de-
regulating AT&T as to intrastate tolls or using price caps, a
technique only now under study by the FCC."° Admittedly,
Fowler could again claim that Congressional pressures held
him back, but it seems to me that an inquiry could have been
opened well before 1987.11
Fowler would claim that he did take deregulatory action in
Computer Inquiry 111,12 eliminating the need for AT&T and
the divested Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) to employ fully
separated subsidiaries (FSSs) when engaging in equipment or
enhanced services. 3 However, I regard that action as an unnec-
essary and indeed unfortunate "grandstand" play. The FSS
system worked: it prevented improper cross-subsidization and
ensured that there would be fair interconnection for BOC ri-
vals. With the elimination of the FSS, the FCC must rely upon
accounting (something that has never worked) and comparably
efficient interconnection (CEI), a difficult process that is cer-
8. See USA Today, Nov. 12, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
9. "Back to the Future," supra note 3, at 157 n.37.
10. See NTIA, TELEPHONE COMPETITION AND DEREGULATION: A SURVEY OF THE
STATES ( U.S. Department of Commerce, Oct. 1986); NTIA REGULATORY ALTERNA-
TIVES REPORT 37-44 (July 1987).
11. In the Matter of Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers,
Order in CC Docket No. 87-313, DA 87-1571 (released Oct. 30, 1987).
12. Third Computer Inquiry, Report and Order in CC Docket No. 85-229, FCC 86-
252, 60 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 603 (adopted May 15, 1986); see "Back to the Future,"
supra note 3, at 188-91.
13. With the breakup of AT&T in 1984, seven regional companies were created,
and these companies in turn own the divested operating companies within the states.
In Computer II Inquiry, Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, modified on reconsideration,
84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980), further modified on reconsideration, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981),
affd sub nom. Computer & Communications Indust. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C.
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983), affirmed on second further reconsidera-
tion, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 56 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 301 (1984), the FCC
deregulated the equipment and enhanced service areas (i.e., 84 services using data
processing along with telecommunications). If, however, monopoly carriers engaged
in such deregulated services, they could.compete unfairly by improperly assigning
more joint and common costs to the monopoly side of the enterprise or by giving com-
petitors unequal access to their essential "bottleneck" facilities. The FCC therefore
decided upon the FSS as a means of dealing with these problems. With the FSS, there
could be no common or joint facilities, and interconnection with the parent would be
the same for the subsidiary and its rivals.
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tainly not deregulatory. 14 In the future, CEI (a specific inter-
face for a specific service) is to give way to ONA (Open
Network Architecture),' but no one knows what ONA really is
and how and when it will work out. In my view, the FCC sim-
ply should have recognized that in some cases the FSS blocked
needed progress because the service (e.g., protocol and code
conversion) technically must be integrated into the network;
where there are such economies of scope, a waiver should be
granted, with appropriate accounting and CEI conditions.
In so proceeding and in trumpeting in the 1986 law review
article that ONA would lead to "total deregulation,' ' 16 Fowler
also created the wrong mood. The BOCs will retain their mo-
nopoly status for the rest of the century, at least. No develop-
ment - neither ONA, nor ISDN (integrated service digital
network)," nor the use of fiber optic cable - will lessen that
monopoly. Indeed, these developments will enhance the im-
portance of the ubiquitous local transport network. Whatever
the prospects for digital radio or cellular services, they will not
break the BOC bottleneck in the foreseeable future.
Fowler's talk of deregulation was thus unfortunate. Judge
Harold Greene had before him the request of the Department
of Justice to revise the decree in the AT&T antitrust suit 8 to
allow BOC participation in equipment manufacturing and the
information services. This request was based in significant part
on preventing abuses through effective FCC regulation. But
the judge, citing the FCC's talk of deregulation, found this a
weak reed.' 9
I do not mean to imply that the antitrust court acted soundly.
I think that it did not, and that Fowler again has the better
position of this important policy debate.2" But his talk of dereg-
ulation turned out not to be "cheap." It would have been far
14. "Back to the Future, " supra note 3, at 171 n.69, 192 n.145.
15. Id. at 191-92. ONA is an overall design of a communications carrier's basic
network, permitting all network users (including all enhanced service providers) to
connect equally to the basic network capabilities.
16. Id. at 194.
17. ISDN is a planned hierarchy of digital transmission and switching systems,
synchronized so that all digital elements operate compatibly to transmit voice, data,
and video signals.
18. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Mary-
land v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
19. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 567-79 (D.D.C. 1987).
20. 2 H. GELLER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY TODAY: AGAINST TECHNOLOGY,
ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 30 (1986).
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better if the Fowler FCC, instead of focusing on Computer In-
quiry 111, 21 had set up a clear conflict between Communications
Act policy and antitrust policy by specifying how the FCC was
going to continue vigorous regulation of the BOCs (with waiv-
ers of the FSS in clear and compelling cases), and how BOC
entry in the information services and manufacturing fields was
needed to serve the public interest.22
All of the above can be said to be differences in technique or
approach. The fact is that Fowler's philosophy did fit this area,
and he contributed substantially in implementing that
philosophy.
II
Spectrum Allocation and Authorization;
Standards
The bias towards competition/marketplace worked well in
the important spectrum area. Thus, the Fowler Commission
continued the work of the Ferris Commission in making avail-
able spectrum for low power television.23 It also made authori-
zations for Direct Broadcast Satellite, over the considerable
opposition of the National Association of Broadcasters
(NAB). 24 And there are many other examples of favoring open
competition.
Fowler also strongly favored auctioning the spectrum in the
non-broadcast area, and sought Congressional authorization to
do so.25 But here I believe that while the stated policy was
sound, its implementation was faulty. The National Telecom-
munications and Information Administration (NTIA) had filed
21. See supra, note 12.
22. It is unclear which policy prevails in this conflict, but a strong case can be
made that it is Communications Act policy. See, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of
Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975); United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
23. Low Power Television Service, Report and Order in BC Docket No. 78-253,
FCC 82-107, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,468, as corrected 47 Fed. Reg 30,495, 51 RAD. REG. 2d (P &
F) 476 (adopted Mar. 4, 1982).
24. Direct Broadcast Satellites, Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 676 (1982), rev'd
and remanded, National Assoc. of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Fowler did side with the NAB on the issue of moving to 9 kHz separation in AM
broadcasting on what I consider to be most dubious engineering and cost grounds. In
the Matter of 9 kHz Channel Spacing for AM Broadcasting, Report and Order, 88
F.C.C.2d 290 (1981). But this matter is relatively minor.
25. See Spectrum Auctions: FCC Proposals for the Airwaves, Hearings on H170
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1986).
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in 1980 with the FCC, urging the Commission to use auctions in
authorization frequencies for Multipoint Distribution Systems
(MDS).26 Based on that filing, I urged the Commission to adopt
auctions as to both cellular and satellite orbital applications. 7
The Fowler Commission refused to use auctions as to compet-
ing common carrier applications, stating in the cellular
rulemaking proceeding that its authority to use the lottery was
clear while its authority to auction was not.28 While that is true,
it certainly would have been worth the risk to argue the issue
in court because the odds were at least even. Further, there was
little to lose at the time; Congress was not acting to afford the
auction authority and both the comparative hearing and lottery
represent stultifying processes.
As to standards, I believe that here Fowler's adherence to the
marketplace ill served the public interest. AM Stereo had been
delayed too long because of the FCC's failure to adopt a single
standard;29 any standard would have been better than the con-
fusion and delay caused by the FCC's throwing the matter to
the marketplace. I think the same criticism applies to the
teletext standard,3 although the problems of teletext (and
videotext) in the U.S. transcend the standards facet.
III
Cable Television
This is an area where three industries - cable, broadcasting,
and film - clash, and the Fowler Commission sought not to
26. Instructional Television Fixed Service (MDS Reallocation), CC Docket No.
80-116, FCC 82-243, 48 Fed. Reg. 33,873, 54 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 107 (adopted May 26,
1980) (comments of NTIA). I should disclose that the MDS proposal was my
handiwork.
27. See Cellular Radio Service (Lottery Selection), Memorandum Opinion and
Order, on reconsideration, 50 Fed. Reg. 20,760, as corrected 50 Fed. Reg. 27,953, 58
RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 677, para. 3 (1985) (comments of Henry Geller).
28. See Cellular Lottery Rulemaking, Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 175, para. 28
n.49 (1984).
29. See AM Stereophonic Broadcasting, Report and Order in Docket No. 21313,
FCC 82-111, 47 Fed. Reg. 13,152, 51 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1, paras. 45-60 (adopted Mar.
4, 1982). Previously only FM stations broadcasted in stereo.
30. Teletext Transmission, Report and Order in BC Docket No. 81-741, FCC 83-
120, 48 Fed. Reg. 27,054, 53 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1309, 1327-28 (adopted Mar. 31, 1983).
Currently, teletext, which is transmitted in the time periods between the pulses of
regular broadcast signals, is still largely experimental although it is expected to pro-
vide consumer and business-oriented applications such as news, weather, and shop-
ping information. Videotext, a two-way service by telephone wire or cable TV coaxial
cable, is also a nascent service with similar offerings.
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rock the boat. It rejected my petition to restore syndicated ex-
clusivity,31 even though this tied in perfectly with Fowler's
marketplace philosophy: the broadcaster gets exclusivity
against cable only if it bids and pays for it in the market. The
FCC's failure under Chairman Ferris to afford such exclusivity
results not in deregulation but added governmental intrusion
in the form of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal (CRT).2
More importantly, the FCC refused to act affirmatively on
the Ted Turner petition to revise the must carry rules.3 There
had been great changes in the cable area, especially with the
advent of the satellite delivered cable services. Yet the Com-
mission continued to require systems with limited capacity to
carry broadcast signals that often represented duplicating net-
work stations, as against the real diversity of such cable stations
as CNN, C-SPAN, and USA. The D.C. Circuit reversed the
FCC's inaction on first amendment and arbitrariness grounds. 3 4
Upon remand, the Fowler FCC really wanted to accept the
court's action invalidating must carry rules, and simply call for
Congress to remedy the imbalance by eliminating the compul-
sory license afforded cable systems to carry broadcast signals. 5
But Congressional pressures became too strong, and the agency
largely adopted as an interim rule an industry compromise,
with one major change. The FCC required that subscribers be
told that after five years there would be no must carry require-
ments and therefore the subscriber might have need of an A/
B 36 switch and antenna in order to receive some over-the-air
31. Petition for Rule Making of Henry Geller, Syndicated Program Exclusivity
and Sports Telecasts, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 27,054, 56 RAD.
REG. 2d (P & F) 625 (1984). The FCC under Chairman Patrick has opened a rulemak-
ing proceeding to restore syndicated exclusivity. In re Amendment of Parts 73 and 76
of the Commission's Rules Relating to Program Exclusivity in the Cable and Broad-
cast Industries, Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in Gen. Docket
No. 87-24, FCC 87-65 (released Apr. 23, 1987).
32. National Cable Television Ass'n v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 724 F.2d 176
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
33. Cable Television Mandatory Signal Carriage Rules, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, FCC 84-136, 55 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1365 (1984). These rules require
cable systems to carry local TV stations so that such stations have access to the cable
subscribers.
34. Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
2889 (1986).
35. See Statement of Chairman Fowler, Commissioners Patrick & Dawson, Aug.
2, 1985, on "must carry," Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rule Making, MM
Docket No. 85-349, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,232 (released Nov. 14, 1985).
36. An A/B switch is a switch installed at the VHF terminals enabling the cable
subscriber to receive channels 2-13 without the aid of cable.
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signals. 7
I regard this as a most flawed decision. The A/B switch was
correctly rejected by the FCC in the past as a useless and inef-
fective device;3 it does not mesh with the reality of subscriber
viewing and is an artificial government solution. The FCC
should have rejected the industry compromise and adopted a
narrow, permanent rule directed to those situations where car-
riage is required in the public interest: stations in sparsely
populated areas,39 non-commercial stations, community sta-
tions, and new UHF independents. I believe that such action is
required by Congressional mandates" and is constitutionally
sound as agency action directed to priority of carriage of broad-
cast signals.4'
Further, I fault the Fowler Commission for just talking about
the compulsory license and not acting. Of course, the FCC can-
not repeal the compulsory license or act directly in the copy-
right field. But the compulsory license is wedded to FCC
regulation: it is a license to carry signals authorized by the
Commission. In 1980 the FCC changed such authorizations
from a limited number, geared to the size of television market
involved, to an unlimited number.42 Why couldn't the FCC in
1987 authorize the carriage of distant signals only in the
smaller markets (e.g., 100 or more), finding that in light of
changed circumstances, the marketplace works well in the top
100 markets? Again I filed a petition seeking action along these
lines, with no success.43 Admittedly, there would be Congres-
37. Must Carry Rules, Report and Order in MM Docket No. 85-349, FCC 86-357,
51 Fed. Reg. 44,606, 61 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 792 (adopted Aug. 7, 1986); reconsid.
generally denied, Memorandum Opinion and Order, MM Docket No. 85-349 (released
May 1, 1987), summarized in 52 Fed. Reg. 17, 574 (May 11, 1987), rev'd, Century Com-
munications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), petition for reh. pending.
38. See, e.g., Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C.
683, para. 51 (1965); Cable Television Mandatory Signal Carriage Rules, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 55 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1365 at para. 9.
39. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359, 365-66 (D.C. Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
40. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(s), 307(b), 309 (i)(3)(A), 396 (a)(5),(6) (1987).
41. I should disclose here that I represent, pro bono, the Office of Communication
of the United Church of Christ in its effort to obtain reversal and remand of the FCC
action in the case now before the D.C. Circuit. See supra note 37.
42. CATV Syndicated Program and Exclusivity Rules, Report and Order, 79
F.C.C.2d 663, para. 4 (1980), affd sub nom. Malrite T.V. of New York v. FCC, 652 F.2d
1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
43. Must Carry Rules, 51 Fed. Reg. 44,606, 61 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 792, para. 178
(proposal of Henry Geller and Donna Lampert).
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sional uproar and court appeals; the matter is a difficult legal
one. But a Commission dedicated to fair competition and the
marketplace should have taken the chance.
IV
Broadcast
I come now to the area where I have the greatest disagree-
ment with Fowler - broadcast. First, however, I acknowledge
again my complete agreement with his commitment to open
competition among the existing broadcasters. Thus, it is not
Fowler's fault that because of marketplace considerations, di-
rect broadcast satellite (DBS) competition did not develop; he
acted promptly and effectively to provide the governmental
structure to permit such competition.44
Second, and paradoxically, I do not disagree with Fowler as
to the best course to follow in broadcasting: deregulate and
take from commercial broadcasters substantial sums of money
for the use of non-commercial broadcasting and other public
interest purposes (for example, support of minority owner-
ship). Fowler would do this because he believes that the first
amendment requires broadcasters to come under the print
model, and weakly advocates the spectrum usage fee as an ac-
companying device.45 I would do so because I would acknowl-
edge that after five decades the regulation of broadcasting by
the FCC has been ineffectual - in former Commissioner Glen
0. Robinson's apt phrasing, a wrestling match full of grunts
and groans but signifying no real action.46 It is therefore time
to turn to a structure that works for the public interest, first in
radio and then, if successful, in television. The commercial
broadcaster would continue to act as it does today while the
non-commercial broadcaster, who is motivated to act in the
44. See supra note 24.
45. Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX.
L. REV. 207, 247-50 (1982).
46. In Re Applications of Cowles Florida Broadcasting, 60 F.C.C.2d 371, 439 (1976)
(dissenting opinion of Commissioner Glen 0. Robinson). Commissioner Robinson de-
scribed the F.C.C.'s actions:
It rather resembles a professional wrestling match in which the contestants'
grappling, throwing, thumping - with attendant grunts and groans - are
mere dramatic conventions having little impact on the final result. Of course,
wrestling fans know the result is fixed and generally in whose favor; still
they fill the bleachers to see how it is done. So it is in the present case.
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public interest, would be in a much better position to do so.
The structure would finally work for the effectuation of public
service goals.
Why then am I so critical of Fowler's actions in this field?
While Fowler has a perfect right to urge deregulation, he swore
an oath to uphold the law, and the law indisputably calls for the
broadcaster to act as a public trustee - a fiduciary for his com-
munity.47 Fowler cannot properly abandon this public trustee
obligation. While the Constitution takes precedence over the
Communications Act, this is of no help to Fowler (or Chairman
Patrick and the other Commissioners today who are similarly
at fault), because Fowler is not the judge of the Act's constitu-
tionality - only the courts are, and in this case only the
Supreme Court.4" Stated differently, Fowler cannot declare
the Communications Act unconstitutional.49 If he genuinely
believes that it is, I suggest that he should have not become
Chairman where he would have to implement an unconstitu-
tional statute.
Because Fowler believes that the print model should govern
(or in his words, "television is just a toaster with pictures"),5 °
he has acted in a disgraceful fashion in this area. The examples
are so legion that I will cite only a few.
The area of children's television is most important. Young
children watch television a great deal (30 hours a week). Since
they represent the future of this country, broadcasters, as pub-
lic trustees, should render some reasonable amount of public
service programming for children - that is, programming that
not only entertains but also informs and educates. Virtually all
prior FCC chairmen would urge the commercial broadcasters
47. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC (UCC III),
707 F.2d 1413, 1427-30 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 394 (1969); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC (UCC
I), 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
48. Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court has dis-
cussed the constitutionality of the Act not only in Red Lion but also in National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943), National Citizens Commit-
tee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 436 U.S. 775 (1978), Columbia Broadcasting System v.
FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981), and in dictum on several other occasions. See Pacific Gas &
Elec. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 106 S. Ct. 903, 908 n.6, reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1667
(1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). I believe that the Act remains
constitutional.
49. Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974).
50. Television Dig., October 19, 1987, at 4.
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to do so - a process called "lifted eyebrow." Fowler gave a
speech in 198351 in which he not only deplored "lifted eye-
brow" 52 but then asserted that at renewal the broadcaster had
no obligation to children to which the FCC would hold the li-
censee responsible.53  I find that incredible: a broadcaster
which need not render public service to children is not a public
trustee - rather the broadcaster is just a movie theater playing
"Loony Tunes."
Fowler demonstrated that the marketplace was king as to
children. The Fowler FCC overruled a prior precedent 4 pro-
scribing program length commercials in children's TV pro-
gramming, and eliminated guidelines limiting over-
commercialization in children's programming.55 The courts
have reversed, pointing out that the half hour program really
has commercial material and that the marketplace does not
work in the case of young children, thus calling into question
the elimination of the over-commercialization guidelines.56
The entire mess is now back in the FCC's hands, to be dealt
with by the Patrick FCC.57 Surely Rupert Murdoch is correct
when he says that this type of action (i.e., making children the
51. Address by Mark Fowler, Chairman FCC, Arizona State University (Feb. 11,
1983) (Children's Television and the FCC), cited in Washington Ass'n for Television
& Children v. FCC, 712 F.2d 677, 683 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
52. I do not fault Fowler in that respect; I believe strongly that the FCC should
adopt rules or guidelines through an open process that can be challenged in court,
rather than using the "lifted eyebrow" technique, which is in any event not effective
over the long run.
53. Fowler later led the FCC to adopt a new statement as to children's television.
The new statement removed the obligation to render a reasonable amount of informa-
tional programming, including that of an age-specific nature. TV Programming for
Children, Report and Order, 96 F.C.C.2d 634, para. 46 (1984), affd sub nom. Action
for Children's Television v. FCC, 756 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1985). This largely gutted the
1974 statement. Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1
(1974). The 1984 statement did say that each television broadcaster had a duty to serve
the unique child audience but the real message to broadcasters had been delivered in
the Arizona speech and by gutting the 1974 statement.
54. Letter from Ben F. Waple, Secretary, to American Broadcasting Cos., 23
F.C.C.2d 132 (1970); In Re Complaint of Topper Corp. Concerning American Broad-
casting Cos. and Mattel, Inc., 21 F.C.C.2d 148 (1969). But see National Ass'n for Better
Broadcasting v. FCC, 830 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
55. Television Deregulation, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 358,
paras. 20-23 (1986).
56. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741, 745-47 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
see also National Ass'n for Better Broadcasting v. FCC, 830 F.2d at 275-77.
57. In the Matter of Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies,
Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Tele-
vision Stations, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking/Notice of Inquiry, in MM
Docket No. 83-670, FCC 87-338 (adopted Oct. 20, 1987, released Nov. 9, 1987).
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object of a half hour commercial) is a "prostitution of the
broadcaster's function."58 But it is one permitted and indeed
fostered by Fowler.
Along the same lines, Fowler eliminated the anti-trafficking
policy, 59 stating that allowing the station to be dedicated to the
"higher valued use" automatically serves the public interest.6 °
But a trafficker by definition seeks to increase the financial
value of the station, so that it can be sold for more money.61
And that in turn means that the trafficker is not going to pres-
ent a Sesame Street-type children's program but rather a
straight entertainment cartoon. It is only regulation that
makes the commercial broadcaster "put profit in second place
and the children in first."62 It is absurd of Fowler to assert that
trafficking - getting the highest profit - serves the public in-
terest as to non-entertainment programming, the agency's only
area of concern.63
In the critical area of license renewal, the Fowler FCC has
done enormous damage to the public interest concept. Admit-
tedly Fowler built on the prior handiwork of the Ferris Com-
mission, which substantially deregulated radio broadcasting.64
Fowler extended that deregulation to television, with the result
that the FCC today is renewing all stations, radio and televi-
sion, with no notion of what they are doing as to public service;
it receives only a postcard.65 The Commission is relying on the
public to bring to its attention stations that are not rendering
58. At Large, BROADCASTING, Apr. 13, 1987, at 70 (interview with Rupert
Murdoch).
59. The Commission's anti-trafficking policy held that trafficking in broadcast
licenses is inconsistent with the public interest because it allows exploitation of a
broadcast facility solely for the purpose of profit-making rather than service to the
public in accordance with the overall broadcast scheme of responsible public trustees.
See Transfer of Broadcast Facilities, Report and Order in. BC Docket No. 81-897, FCC
82-519, 47 Fed. Reg. 55,924, 52 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1081, para. 26 (adopted Nov. 18,
1982), affd Memorandum Opinion and Order, 99 F.C.C.2d 971 (1984); Crowder v.
FCC, 399 F.2d 569, 571 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968).
60. Transfer of Broadcast Facilities, 52 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1081 at para. 26.
61. Crowder v. FCC, 399 F.2d at 571-72.
62. Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 59
(1974).
63. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
64. Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, para. 117, recon.
granted in part, 87 F.C.C.2d 797 (1981), affd in part and remanded in part sub nom.
Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
65. Commercial TV Stations, Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, paras. 89-90
(1984); Television Regulation, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration,
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adequate public service - a reliance in no way justified by pub-
lic participation in the renewal process.66 Just ask yourself:
When was the last time you were motivated to go down to a
broadcast station and inspect its records of public service?
Incredibly, the Fowler FCC sought to keep the needed log
information from the public, 67 and had to be dragged by two
court appeals into giving the public sufficient information,
without burdensome monitoring, to file a petition to deny re-
newal on programming grounds.6" None have been filed. Nor
did the Fowler FCC ever keep its assurance that it would have
random audits of stations69 or that it would monitor the results
of deregulation.7 °
Furthermore, the Fowler (and Ferris) Commissions have
made a mess of deregulation. The FCC has shifted its focus
from non-entertainment programming to community issue-ori-
ented programming.71 This is odd because non-entertainment
is as broad a category as one can get, and it is desirable to afford
the broadcaster maximum discretion.
The problem, however, comes in logging. The broadcaster
has to keep a record of all its public service programming be-
cause its license can be challenged at renewal.72 In addition,
broadcasters keep another set of records. As one trade associa-
tion told the FCC, broadcasters must keep comprehensive
records of their programs and commercials for business pur-
poses in order to bill advertisers.73 Further, the new set of
records as to community issue-oriented fare involves manage-
104 F.C.C.2d 358 (1986), rev'd in part sub nom. Action for Children's Television v.
FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
66. See Black Citizens for Fair Media v. FCC, 719 F.2d 407, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(Wright, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984).
67. UCC II, 707 F.2d at 1442.
68. Id.; Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC (UCC IV),
779 F.2d 702, 709-10 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
69. Radio Broadcast Services: Revision of Applications for Renewal of License of
Commercial and Noncommercial AM, FM, & Television Licensees, Report and Order
in Docket No. 80-253, FCC 81-146, 46 Fed. Reg. 26,236, 49 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 740,
para. 3 (1981).
70. Cf. UCC III, 707 F.2d at 1442.
71. Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C. 2d 968, para. 24; Commercial TV Stations,
Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, para. 32 (1984).
72. The broadcaster's lawyers tell the broadcaster to do so, as do the commission-
ers. See, e.g., Quello Criticizes FCC on Must-Carry Rules, BROADCASTING, Sept. 29,
1986, 75, 76.
73. Deregulation of Radio, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 49 Fed. Reg. 43,474,
57 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 93, para. 4 (1984). See also The Myth of Deregulation, BROAD-
CASTING, Aug. 15, 1983, at 27-28; Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1982, at A29, col. 3.
19881
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
rial time, and thus imposes a larger burden on this score.74
This is crazy. The whole idea is to deregulate - to lessen the
burden on the broadcaster. The Fowler FCC should have sim-
ply said: "Just make available at the station the logs you are
keeping for business purposes (denoting the program as en-
tertainment or non-entertainment - a clerical activity) and
send us a postcard." Instead, while talking about saving
thousands of hours of logging time, it deliberately imposes an
additional and unnecessary logging burden on the broadcaster.
It is most fitting that Television Deregulation5 occurred in
1984, the year depicted in George Orwell's famous novel with
its "doublespeak" concept.
Nor is that the end of problems with an issue-oriented ap-
proach. Such an approach inevitably takes the agency into a
sensitive and forbidden area. Thus, in Television Deregulation,
the Fowler FCC stressed:
[P]etitioners raising programming issues will have to demon-
strate that an individual station is failing to address issues fac-
ing the community in its programming....
The focus of our inquiry in the petition to deny context can
be expected to be whether the challenged licensee acted rea-
sonably in choosing the issues it addressed in its programming.
Assessing the reasonableness of a licensee's decision will neces- ,
sitate an ad hoc review to examine the circumstances in which
the programming decision was made.76
I can think of nothing more chilling or inappropriate than to
have the FCC as the national nanny of issue decisions by broad-
casters. The Fowler FCC is strangely proud of having turned
from quantitative emphasis to one "that emphasizes the quality
of a broadcaster's efforts. '77
Two final examples of the Fowler FCC's inadequacies are
fairness and minority broadcasting policies. In the latter area,
the Fowler FCC has its own Bob Jones University fiasco 78 - its
attempt to overrule long-established policies promoting minor-
ity broadcast ownership on constitutional and administrative
grounds. But the constitutional issue has been settled by the
74. Deregulation of Radio, Second Report and Order, 96 F.C.C.2d 930, para. 22
(1984).
75. Commercial TV Stations, Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, para. 32 (1984).
76. Id. at paras. 37, 39 (footnotes omitted).
77. UCC IV, 779 F.2d at 712.
78. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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courts,79 and so has the nexus between minority ownership and
the public interest in diversification of viewpoints reaching the
American people. 0
As to the Fowler FCC's 1985 report questioning the legality
of the Fairness Doctrine,8 ' both its pegs are wrong. The Report
asserts that there is no longer any scarcity warranting the fair-
ness doctrine. But the scarcity supporting the public trustee
notion is that more people want to broadcast than there are
available channels or frequencies, and therefore when the gov-
ernment licenses one entity and keeps off all others, it may
constitutionally require the licensee to act as a fiduciary for
those kept off. 2 That is admittedly still the case today.
As to the second peg - that the Fairness Doctrine is chilling
- the supporting evidence is weak and contradicted by prior
FCC reviews and a recent one by the Congress. 3 In any event,
the FCC could alleviate strains by adopting a different standard
(e.g., malice - bad faith or reckless disregard of the Doctrine)
to be applied generally at renewal8 4 and could take effective ac-
tion to implement the first peg of the Doctrine - that broad-
casters devote a reasonable amount of time to controversial
issue programming.8 5 Significantly, the Fowler FCC and today
the Patrick Commission have not comprehended that there is
no such thing as a surgical strike at the Fairness Doctrine; if
fairness is eliminated on the grounds set out by the Commis-
sion, the entire public trustee concept of the Act unravels.
Finally, there is Fowler's last action at the FCC - the deci-
sion calling for more vigorous enforcement of the ban on inde-
cent programming.8 6 The Commission previously had soundly
79. West Mich. Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Johnson v.
Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 107 S.Ct. 1442 (1987).
80. Congress has done so in specific legislation. Communications Amendments
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259, 96 Stat. 1087, 1094-95 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§ 309 (i)(3)(A)(c)(ii); H. R. Conf Rep. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
81. Fairness Doctrine Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 143 (1985), appeal dismissed as moot,
RTNDA v. FCC, No. 85-1691, slip. op. (D.C. Cir., September 23, 1987).
82. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 367, 394; 48 F.C.C.2d 1, paras. 7-
11 (1974).
83. See H. R. Rep. No. 108, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. R. Rep. No. 134, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
84. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Committee, 412 U.S. 94,
110, 125 (1973).
85. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 393.
86. Indecency Enforcement Standards, Public Notice, FCC 87-153, 62 RAD. REG 2d
(P & F) 1218 (released Apr. 29, 1987), Memorandum Opinion and Order, on reconsid-
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limited the application of the Pacifica decision, 7 and had made
clear that presentation of indecent or borderline programming
channelled to late evening hours (i.e., ten p.m. or later) was
permissible.8 8 It is wrong for the FCC to now say that such
channelling will not protect against punitive action,89 and to
seek prosecution of a station for a program broadcast at ten
p.m. with serious social value (i.e., a poignant drama about
AIDS and homosexuals).9" For one committed to expanding
first amendment freedoms for the broadcaster, Fowler's actions
in this respect are inexplicable.
Conclusion
The last section has been harsh in its evaluation of the
Fowler FCC. But in concluding, I stress that I find much to
admire in Fowler and his philosophy. Fowler served on the
FCC far beyond the usual tenure of chairmen because he obvi-
ously enjoyed public service. And he did render substantial
public service in several important areas. I note again my full
agreement with his competitive actions in common carrier, his
effort for open competition from new services like DBS in
broadcasting, his call for elimination of the compulsory license
and for use of auctions in non-broadcast allocations, and his no-
tion of deregulating broadcasting in exchange for a spectrum
usage fee for non-commercial broadcasting.
But in the end I find a mixed bag largely because of the ac-
tions undermining the public trustee notion in broadcasting.
Admittedly Fowler does not stand alone here. Ferris contrib-
uted with Deregulation of Radio,9 and the Postcard Renewal
eration, FCC 87-365 (released Dec. 29, 1987), appeal pending sub nom. Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, No. 88-1064 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
87. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (sustaining the FCC's authority to
hold that a radio broadcast containing "seven dirty words" was "indecent" under 18
U.S.C. § 1464); see also 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) (1983).
88. See Pacifica Foundation, Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 87-138, 62
RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1191, para..25 (1987); see also Citizen's Complaint Against
Pacifica Foundation, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976).
89. Indecency Enforcement Standards, 62 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) at 1219 (inde-
cency actionable if broadcast at a time of day when there is a "reasonable risk that
children may be in the audience"). Upon reconsideration, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, FCC 87-365, (released Dec. 29, 1987), the FCC designated midnight as a safe
harbor for indecent programs, which are thus foreclosed to adults during the entire
broadcast day (six a.m. to midnight), even if they have serious social value.
90. See Pacifica Foundation, 62 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1191, para. 25.
91. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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proposal,92 and Patrick and his colleagues are just as bad. Nor
am I being a political partisan in that evaluation. Just compare
the actions of the FCC under Chairman Dean Burch and Rich-
ard Wiley, especially in the area of children's television, with
those of Fowler. So my verdict is: one thumb up, one thumb
down.
92. Revision of Applications for Renewal of License of Commercial and Noncom-
mercial AM, FM, and Television Licensees, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in Gen.
Docket 80-253, FCC 80-327, 45 Fed. Reg. 47,444 (1980).
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